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Abstract 
 
Generic competition in the pharmaceutical market is an effective cost-containment 
mechanism that improves static efficiency and stimulates pharmaceutical innovation. There is 
no prior study that has empirically analysed the relative delays in adoption of generic 
competition. This paper aims to investigate how price regulations in the OECD affect the 
adoption of generic competition following the first global generic launch of each molecule. 
Drawing upon data from 1999 to 2008, we estimate the impact of ex-ante price and market 
size expectations on the probability of generic launch using discrete-time duration modelling 
with cloglog and logit regressions. The econometric strategy employs both parametric and 
non-parametric duration dependence and includes controls for generic competition in each 
country, firm characteristics and molecule heterogeneity. Ex-ante profit expectations result in 
faster adoption; both expected price and market size increase the probability of launch. Our 
findings suggest that neither molecule nor firm characteristics have a significant effect on 
generic adoption across different specifications. Instead, evidence indicates that generic 
competitors follow a locally oriented strategy in contrast to research-intensive pharmaceutical 
firms. 
JEL-Code: I110, L510. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
A generic drug is chemically bioequivalent to the originator reference product with the same 
qualitative and quantitative composition in active ingredients, same form, route of 
administration, safety, and efficacy (Scott Morton 1999; Lichtenberg and Philipson 2002; 
Scottorn 2009). Generics that are almost by definition cost-effective alternatives to branded 
medicines offer the most visible source of savings and efficiency gains. Hence, delays in the 
entry of generic competition following patent expiry imply substantial opportunity costs for 
the sustainability of healthcare systems. Delays are due to exogenous reasons, such as the 
timing of the corresponding brand-name’s patent expiration and the degree of administrative 
delay, but in part due to companies’ strategic entry in specific market and therapeutic groups 
where the probability of profiting from lower priced products is higher. Paradoxically, despite 
the increasing economic importance of generic competition, there is surprisingly little 
empirical evidence on generic adoption and drivers of delays across major pharmaceutical 
markets. The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine how different pricing regulations 
influence the adoption of generic competition using price and volume data from 1999 to 2008 
in the OECD market.  
Given the lower potential for product differentiation, generics predominantly engage in price 
competition resulting in a significant pressure on branded price levels and market competition. 
Branded share of market revenues in the US within 2 yrs of patent expiration generally falls by 
50% (Griliches and Cockburn 1994). Similarly, average prices in Europe appear to drop by 
25% after the second year exclusivity is lost (DG Competition 2009). Generic competition, 
therefore, improves equity of access to pharmaceutical treatment. Timely generic entry is 
important not only from a static efficiency perspective but also from a dynamic perspective. 
Incentives to invest in future innovation are higher when branded manufactures face generic 
competition1. Furthermore, resources saved by payers due to early generic adoption can be 
transferred to stimulate future innovation in the branded sector.2 From a strategic perspective, 
                                                 
1 Consistently,  the economics literature defines strategies of  monopolists that  have little incentive to develop 
new products that will compete directly against their products as  the replacement effect (Tirole 1990). 
2 Given aging demographic profiles, growing trend towards chronic life-style diseases, and expected patent 
expiries, policy measures conducive to fast generic adoption and diffusion offer significant savings in the near 
future Gorka, E. (2009). "Generics at the crossroads: Will Europe lead the way forward." Journal of Generic 
Medicines 6(3): 193-205. 
 .  
 
3 
 
timing to market is a key dimension of competition in the generic sector. Legislations in some 
markets grant market exclusivity to the first generic company that files for authorization (e.g. 
in the US exclusivity is 180 days). More specifically, first generics are expected to launch at 
higher prices and maintain generic market leadership as the demand-side may be reluctant to 
switch across alternative generics. Pharmacies, for instance, would avoid stocking multiple 
generics for a given molecule due to efficiency concerns (Competition Bureau Canada 2007).    
Regulatory and financial barriers to market entry in the generic sector are highly asymmetric 
compared to the branded sector. Sunk costs are much lower in the generic sector since 
substantial R&D outlays for drug discovery and clinical trials to prove safety and efficacy are 
not required3. The cost of a bioavailability test has been estimated to be 18 times cheaper than 
the average costs of safety and clinical evaluation, which allows generics prices to be 20-80% 
cheaper than originators  (Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 1993; Simoens S and de 
Coster S 2006). Canadian Generic Drug Sector Study (2007) estimates bioequivalence study 
costs in the range of $1-1.5m per product. Second, the technical and market risks faced by 
generic manufacturers are much lower as the therapeutic and commercial success of the 
originator has been tested by the time of patent expiry. Third, countries in the OECD have 
adopted several measures to further ease generic entry: generic substitution, Bolar provisions4, 
market exclusivity grants to first generics (US), and generic reference pricing. Overall, the 
time it takes a generic drug from the research lab to the patient is 3-5 years, whereas branded 
drugs take about 12 years.  On the other hand, generics may be subject to behavioural barriers 
to adoption and diffusion as a result of virtual perceived quality differences between branded 
and generic products. In particular, price-insensitive consumers or physicians may show a 
strong loyalty for brand-name drugs (Frank and Salkaver 1992), and physicians may have 
sticky prescribing habits that hamper switching to generic drugs (Hellerstein 1998; Coscelli 
2000).  
Bolar provisions allow generic manufacturers to experiment with a drug before the expiry of 
the patent and apply for market authorization (MA). Bolar provisions were granted in the US 
by the Hatch Waxman Act in 1984, and Europe followed with a delay of twenty years in 2004. 
In countries such as the US, UK and Germany, generic medicines obtain immediate price and 
reimbursement approval following MA. In contrast, most markets that require price and 
                                                 
3 Entry costs are greatest for the first generic due to legal challenges and costs fall for follower generics. 
4 Bolar provisions allow generics to obtain marketing approval  prior to the patent expiry of the originator 
molecule and thus virtually immediate entry upon patent expiry 
4 
 
reimbursement approval may delay market access of generic products. Time delays for 
generics following MA were on average 153 days in the EU, with a significant variation 
across Member States depending on local pricing and reimbursement (P&R) regulations 
(Bongers and Carradinha 2009). Generic price may be established as a percentage of the 
reference product, as the average price in reference countries, as a maximum (index) price or 
negotiation-based price (price-volume trade-off).  
We argue that the variation in the timing of first generic availability for a given molecule can 
be explained by both ex-ante price and volume expectations.  More specifically, free-priced 
markets not only avoid additional delays due to P&R approval but also offer higher incentives 
to market entry as a result of higher generic prices and higher generic penetration. Generic 
volumes are expected vary significantly across countries due to different demand-side policies, 
consumer attitudes and healthcare infrastructures. Hence, we examine whether  ex-ante 
volume expectations affect the of probability of a generic product launch given lower profit 
margins No study in the literature has empirically analysed the existing differentials in launch 
for first generics across a comprehensive set of markets. This paper aims to provide 
preliminary evidence to fill this gap in the literature. Our empirical strategy uses discrete-time 
duration analysis to estimate the impact of regulation on the probability of launch across 
twenty pharmaceutical markets controlling for market size, expected competition, molecule 
and firm heterogeneity.  
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature and sets 
the theoretical framework; Section 3 describes the methodology used; Section 4 presents 
estimation results and finally Section 5 discusses findings and policy implications. 
 
2  GENERIC ENTRY: EVIDENCE FROM THE LITERATURE  
2.1  Regulation as a Barrier to Generic Entry 
Generic Entry in the North American Market 
Most of the evidence on generic entry is from the North American market. This is partially 
because the generic sector has matured faster in the US as a response to provisions of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984. Empirical studies on generic entry have demonstrated that pre-
entry market size and expected profits (Grabowski and Vernon 1992; Scott Morton 1999; 
Scott Morton 2000; Reiffen and Ward 2005; Saha, Grabowski et al. 2006); firm and drug 
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characteristics (Bae 1997; Scott Morton 1999), brand-name drug's goodwill stock  (Hurwitz 
and Caves 1988; Hudson 2000); market structure and competition (Bae 1997) are important 
factors in the generic firms’ entry decision. Moreover, entry dynamics differ strongly across 
therapeutic-classes (Saha, Grabowski et al. 2006). 
Bae (1997) investigates the speed of generic entry post-patent expiry in the US market using a 
proportional hazard model with continuous failure times (Bae 1997). Higher revenues before 
patent expiry, proxied by the sales revenue of the brand-name manufacturers before patent 
loss, are associated with higher generic entry. Bae (1997) finds that the higher the degree of 
competition as proxied by the number of brand-name competitors, the slower the generic 
entry. The number of new generic entrants decreases as the number of generic incumbents 
increases (Saha, Grabowski et al. 2006). There also exists direct evidence which shows that 
revenue and the extent of entry are positively related for off-patent molecules during 1984-
1987 (Frank and Salkever 1997). Similarly, Hudson (2000) identifies market size (original 
brand sales, deflated by the consumer price index) at patent expiration as the most significant 
determinant of generic entry in the US, the UK, Germany, and Japan. Increases in sales 
reduces the generic entry lag after patent expiration in these markets (Hudson 2000).  
According to evidence from the US market during 1984-1994, generic firms enter markets 
with similar operating conditions to the drugs they already produce (Scott Morton 1999). 
Generic entry rates are also affected by the proportion of hospital sales. Drugs with higher 
hospital sales and drugs that treat chronic conditions exhibit higher entry rates in the US 
during 1986-1991. The number of brand-name competitors reduce generic entry whereas no 
significant evidence is found regarding the number of off-patent brands in the same 
therapeutic-group (Scott Morton 2000). In contrast to findings from the US studies by Bae 
(1997) and Scott Morton (2000), a more recent study by Magazzini et al observes that 
different brand names have a positive effect on generic entry in USA, UK, Germany, and 
France (Magazzini, Pammolli et al. 2004).  
Generic Entry in Regulated Markets 
Several studies have identified pharmaceutical price regulation (Danzon and Chao 2000b; 
Ekelund and Persson 2003; Moreno-Torres, Puig-Junoy et al. 2007) as a significant factor in 
generic firms’ entry decision. The evidence on the impact of different regulations on generic 
entry, however, is limited.  
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Evidence from the Swedish market in 1972-1996 suggests that expected profits are associated 
with higher generic entry in a regulated environment too. The shorter the patent protection for 
the branded product, the higher the number of generic entrants (Rudholm 2001). Subsequent 
evidence from the Spanish market suggests that drivers of generic entry in a market with tough 
price regulations are similar to those in less regulated markets. Moreno-Torres et al (2009) 
estimate the number of generic firms that enter into different active ingredient markets during 
1999-20055, ignoring firm’s follow-on launches with different forms and doses. Both a higher 
number of generic incumbent firms and a higher number of molecules per therapeutic group 
decrease the average number of generic entries. This study concludes that reference pricing 
squeezes the potential market for generics by lowering branded drug prices (Moreno-Torres, 
Puig-Junoy et al. 2009). Generic use is discouraged if originator prices cluster around the 
reference price level as potential profits for generics are reduced (Simoens S and de Coster S 
2006). Findings from a Swedish study confirm that the reference price system on average 
decreases the probability that generics are launched (Ekelund and Persson 2003). 
Contrary to findings from the US market, evidence from Japan indicates that fewer generics 
enter if the drug is more frequently prescribed in large hospitals. This is predominantly due to 
behavioural reasons as doctors keep strong connections with medical schools where professors 
have high-level involvement in developing brand-name drugs and treatment guidelines. A 
more competitive branded sector in Japan, proxied by the number of brand name drugs already 
in the market, negatively affects generic entry. Economies of scope in entering multiple 
markets and brand revenues are important determinants that explain generic entry in the 
Japanese market (Iizuka 2009). Furthermore, as Iizuka (2009) notes, in Japan, due to 
government regulations, new generics can enter the market only once a year in July. This 
means that there is almost always a delay in generic entry after a brand-name’s patent 
expiration.  
Higher price regulation (as in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain) is not only 
associated with reduced incentives for generic entry but also with limited diffusion of generics 
(Danzon and Chao 2000a; Garattini and Ghislandi 2006; Simoens S and de Coster S 2006). 
Free priced markets (US, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) generally have higher drug 
prices and a higher originator-generic price differential, increasing incentives for generic 
entry. Some authors found that generics enter more quickly into countries where 
                                                 
5 Market definition is at the molecule level 
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“expected” generic prices are higher. According to the authors, this is because these 
markets are more profitable for generic firms. Kyle (2007) find that brand-name drugs 
enter earlier into non-price-regulated markets than regulated markets. If so, patents will 
expire more quickly in non-price-regulated countries, and thus generics can enter into 
these markets earlier. 
 
2.2  Strategic Barriers to Generic Entry 
Economic theory predicts that generic entry should lead to a sharp decline in the price and 
market power of the originator molecule. To counteract market erosion induced by generic 
entry, innovator companies have developed several strategies for product life-cycle 
management to counteract the combined impact of increasing patent losses over time and the 
decrease in pharmaceutical R&D efficiency (Karwal 2006). A significant body of literature 
analyzes the dynamics of branded-generic competition after patent expiry and strategies 
originators pursue to minimize the impact of generic entry on life-cycle profits (Caves, 
Whinston et al. 1991; Grabowski and Vernon 1992; Frank and Salkever 1997; Suh, 
Schondelmeyer et al. 1998; Aronsson, Bergman et al. 2001; Magazzini, Pammolli et al. 2004; 
Lexchin 2006).  
Traditionally, innovators have defended market shares through patent protection strategies that 
include patent clusters and patent litigations to restrict generic penetration. Other common 
strategies are reformulation of the original molecule to shift demand; switching from 
prescription to OTC6 status (that allows direct to consumer marketing in the US) and defensive 
pricing. Reformulation may involve combining the active ingredient with another molecule; 
changing the dosage, route of administration or creating controlled release versions. Defensive 
pricing involves lowering the price of the originator molecule for certain formulations or doses 
or discounts for repeat prescriptions. Another pricing strategy to maintain market share is 
based on market-segmentation by consumer brand loyalty. In free-priced markets, the 
originator may increase off-patent molecule prices to capture more revenue from the 
insensitive segment of the market and retain shares, which is known as the "generic paradox" 
                                                 
6 Over the counter medicine 
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(Frank and Salkaver 1992; Frank and Salkever 1997; Regan 2007; Schweitzer and Comanor 
2007), (Regan 2007; Schweitzer and Comanor 2007)7.  
More recently branded manufacturers have shifted from defence strategies to strategies that 
allow value creation from generics such as alliances with generic companies, authorized and 
in-house generics strategies (Business Insights 2009c). Authorized generics include 
agreements between branded and generic manufacturers that allow generic manufacturers to 
produce and market the active pharmaceutical ingredient before any generic competitor enters 
the market. Authorized generics may block competition and dissipate the first mover 
advantage that grants 180-day market exclusivity provisions to the first generic entrant in the 
US (Peny and Covilard 2007). The branded manufacturers can avoid litigation costs and 
utilize their advantage in manufacturing and marketing by in-house manufacturing of generics.  
A summary of the findings from the literature is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The 
majority of the studies have focused on the extent of generic entry rather than the timing of 
generic adoption. The literature offers very limited evidence on determinants of generic entry 
lags across markets with different pricing mechanisms. This study aims to provide the first 
comparative analysis of generic adoption across 20 markets in the OECD8 by incorporating 
local expected generic price, extent of generic penetration, concentration of the generic sector 
in each market, and firm and molecule heterogeneity.   
3  METHODS 
3.1  Data 
IMS data used in this study contains quarterly MIDAS sales data for the period 1999 Q1 – 
2008 Q3 in 20 major pharmaceutical markets. The data includes USD ($)9 and standard unit 
(SU) sales for each pharmaceutical product by quarter, molecule name, IMS generic 
classification, global and local launch dates, therapeutic class (ATC4), and sales by 
distribution channel (retail versus hospital).. The ex-manufacturer price level for molecules is 
calculated by dividing the ex-manufacturer retail USD sales by volume in SU. Marketing 
                                                 
7 Frank and Salkaver (1992) develop a segmented market model with one branded producer and a competitive 
fringe producing the generic version and find conditions under which the branded price increases. 
8 The country set in alphabetical order is: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK 
and US (South Africa is an enhanced engagement country of the OECD).  
9 Sales figures in USD dollars were deflated by IMF GDP deflators for each country-year. Observations with 
negative sales were dropped. These represent products that have been returned to the manufacturer after the 
product has been withdrawn from the market, and account about 5% of total observations. 
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discounts and margins along the distribution chain are ignored. Launch in Spain, Turkey, 
Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Spain, South Africa represents launch in the retail sector; for 
Sweden launch could be either in the retail or hospital sector.  Launch in the US market could 
be in the retail sector (drugstores, foodstores and mail service) or non-retail sector (clinics, 
federal facilities, HMOs, home health care, long term care, non-federal hospitals and other 
miscellaneous channels) 
The unit of analysis is molecule-country pairs. Once the generic version of a given molecule 
launches in one of the twenty markets, the remaining countries get under risk for the launch of 
the first generic version of the same molecule. This definition allows analyzing differentials in 
relative adoption speed with reference to the first global generic availability. Although we 
cannot control for delay following patent protection expiry, all regressions control for the 
delay of the originator entry following the first global launch of the new molecule. Failure 
time for the first generic product of molecule j-country k pair is defined as the difference 
between the first global generic launch date of molecule j and the local launch date of the 
generic in country k. Missing launch dates are approximated by period of first positive sales 
for molecules with the first generic launch after 1999 Q1.  
The molecule set is restricted to those molecules that have a generic alternative both in the UK 
and the US to avoid potential bias from generics launched exclusively in one market. Also, we 
consider molecules that launched following the establishment of a single European market in 
1993, which account for different dynamics in the pharmaceutical sector. Combination 
molecules composed of several active ingredients are ignored. With all these restrictions, the 
total number of molecules analyzed is 349. 
Discrete time periods are defined in months as failure times (launch dates) are grouped into 
months10. The dataset is expanded for each subject, i.e. molecule-country pair, such that each 
subject contributes one row of data for each time period that the molecule is under risk of 
launching in the destination country. The subject gets under risk after first global launch date 
of the generic copy, and in the final time period the subject fails or is censored. A binary 
indicator is associated with each observation such that a value of 0 is assigned until the last 
observation which is 1 if the molecule launches and 0 if it is censored.  Other time varying 
(e.g. price) and fixed (destination country) explanatory variables are accommodated in this 
data structure.  
                                                 
10 Maximum117 month-periods from January 1999 till September 2008 
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3.2  Model 
Entry of the first generic product in a given country is considered as a binary-outcome model 
defined as unity if entry occurs at time t and zero otherwise. The first generic alternative of 
molecule j launches in country k if expected profits are positive. Let jktΠ  represent the 
discounted post-entry profits for the generic of molecule j in country k. The entry decision 
jktd  observed at time t is:  
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧
≤=>Π=
otherwise0
 1 allfor  0, and0  if1 t-nd
d jknjktjkt  
The profit jktΠ depends on the discounted future revenue stream net of entry costs and 
potential spillovers to markets that reference market k for generic price setting. The discounted 
future profit stream at time t ignoring marginal costs can be expressed as: 
∑ ∑
= ≠
+−⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −⋅=Π
jkLT
l
jktjkt
kr
jkrljkljkl
l
jkt ELQP
1
νδ , where 
P is the expected generic price. Q is the expected market size for the generic alternatives of 
molecule j in country k; E is the fixed cost of entry; LT is the expected life-time of the generic 
product in the destination market;δ  is the discount factor and L is the extent of price spillover 
to market r due to external price referencing.  
The expected price P is a function of branded price levels in the local market and branded-
generic price mark-up which is a function of regulation and competition in the therapeutic 
subgroup. In markets such as the US generic prices are determined freely. In the EU, on the 
other hand, generic prices are regulated in the majority of the countries (83% of European 
countries). Generic medicine prices can be set as a percentage below the originator price level, 
as the average of a selected number of European countries or as a combination of both. In 
markets with reference pricing, regulators set a common reimbursement level for a group of 
interchangeable medicines, which may constitute a barrier for further price competition 
beyond those imposed by regulation (Dylst and Simoens 2010). 
The expected market size Q depends on total sales of the branded drug and the percentage of 
generic penetration in the given market. Penetration of generic medicines is more successful in 
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countries with free pricing than in countries with price regulation. Higher medicine prices 
achieved under free pricing facilitate market entry of generics (Schulz 2004; Martikainen, Kivi 
et al. 2005). In price controlled countries, regulation drives down the price of the originator 
medicine discouraging market entry of generics. Also, the price difference between originators 
and generics tends to be higher in free-priced countries, which results in higher incentives to 
switch to generic alternatives.  Molecule’s therapeutic importance increases branded market 
size and incentives to generic entry. Generic firms compete in price; hence, any scale effects 
that reduce costs will provide a competitive edge.  
Defining row vectors of regulation ( R ), competition (C ), molecule ( M ), firm characteristics 
( F ), the additive reduced-form profit function can be specified as:  
,|| jkttjktjkttFtjkMtjkCjktRjktjkt uu ++=+++++=Π γγ βzβFβMβCβR where 
Rβ , Cβ , Mβ , and Fβ represent corresponding column vectors of parameters to be estimated. 
tγ  is a function of time since global launch t of molecule j and jktu  is a random error term. 
Let ( )jk tz  be a 1 p×  matrix defined as: , , ,jkt jkt jkt jkt jkt⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦z R C M F .  
Given that launch has not occurred up to time interval t, the conditional probability of launch 
during interval t, i.e. the interval hazard rate is: 
( )Pr( 1| ) Pr( 0)jkt jk jk jktd T t h t= ≥ = = Π >  
( )| |Pr 0jkt R jkt C jk t M jk t F t jktuγ= + + + + + >R β C β M β F β  
 ( )Pr 0jkt t jktuγ= + + >z β  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).1Pr tjkttjkttjktjktjk FFuth γγγ +=−−−=−−>= βzβzβz ,  
where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of u and jkT  is the launch time of molecule j 
in country k. We estimate the results using the two most common link functions: 
complementary log-log (cloglog) and logit link functions. Cloglog transformation is the 
discrete-time implementation of the Cox proportional hazard (PH) model that assumes 
continuous failure-times. It is typically used when survival times are measured continuously 
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but grouped on a discrete time scale (e.g. months in this study). It has been shown that the 
discrete-time implementation of the PH model with a cloglog link function results in 
parameter estimates that are equivalent to the population parameters of the PH model that 
generates the data (Prentice and Gloeckler 1978). The logistic model, on the other hand,  
interpreted in terms of the proportional odds of failure (Singer and Willett 1993). 
For the cloglog model ( )jkt tF γ+z β = { }1 exp exp( )jkt tγ− − +z β , which gives the hazard rate: 
  ( ) ( )( )tjktjk th γ+−−= βzexpexp1  or cloglog( )jkt jkt th γ= +z β . 
Using the logistic cumulative function the hazard is parameterized as follows:  
   ( ) 1
1 exp( ( ))jkt t
h tjk γ= ⎡ ⎤+ − +⎣ ⎦z β
,  
where tγ is the vector of duration dependence. Transforming the hazard using a logit link 
function gives the following proportional odds model (Xie, McHugo et al. 2003):  
ln
1 jkt t
h
h
γ⎛ ⎞ = +⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ z β . 
For small hazard values, cloglog and logit regressions for discrete survival analysis yield 
similar estimates (see Appendix, Table A.2). However, in general the estimated coefficients in 
the logit model will be larger than the coefficient estimates in the cloglog model (Abbott 
1985). The logit model has the proportional odd assumption; as such it might be the 
appropriate model if the proportional odd assumption is correct in instances when the hazard 
rates are not “small”.   
The second empirical issue is the appropriateness of the duration-dependence specification for 
the baseline hazards. The empirical strategy in the regressions assumes two different duration 
specifications: i) a parametric specification ( )t f tγ = ; and ii) a semi-parametric specification 
that includes dummies for each month following risk onset, i.e. first global generic adoption. 
This approach provides a robustness check on parametric estimates and helps avoid potential 
bias if the duration dependence is incorrectly specified. 
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3.3  Variables  
We define our independent variables based on findings in industrial organization and strategy 
literature regarding the drivers of market entry (Chryssochoidis and Wong 1998; Wong 2002). 
Variables used account for: i) firm’s external environment, i.e. regulation (R), market size and 
competition (C) and ii) firm’s internal environment, i.e. firm economies of scale and scope (F) 
and molecule heterogeneity (M). A list of descriptive statistics for the control variables used in 
the empirical analysis is provided in the Appendix (Table A.3).  
3.3.1  External Environment 
Identification of Regulation 
Expected Generic Prices 
Regulatory complexity and diversity is captured through expected generic prices of the 
launching molecule. This approach has not been used before for the analysis of generic 
adoption, and is a natural extension of the recent studies that use price information to measure 
the impact of regulation on the timing of new patent-protected molecules. As lower prices 
squeeze the market for generics, it is expected that higher generic prices will increase hazard 
of launch, controlling for market size and structure as well as firm and product characteristics.  
When the first generic is about to enter the market, there are no generic products for the same 
active ingredient. The price of branded products defines price reference for generic copies that 
compete in the market based on price. Regulations in some countries may link generic prices 
to the originator price by setting the generic price a certain percentage (i.e. 30-35%) lower 
than branded products. Several studies have identified that the market share captured by 
generics depends on the relative prices of the generic and originator product. Anis (2003) uses 
the generic-branded price ratio, Pg/Pb, as a measure of how regulation affects generic prices 
and competitiveness (Anis, Guh et al. 2003). This ratio (Pg/Pb) is observed to decrease 
significantly over time as new generics enter the market (Caves, Whinston et al. 1991; 
Grabowski and Vernon 1992). Therefore, we proxy the expected generic price by the product 
of the average branded price for the launching active ingredient and the median generic-
branded price ratio in the local market. Non-generic product prices in each country are 
calculated as a volume-weighted average price of products that have the same active 
ingredient. Lagged or moving average prices are used to avoid problems of endogeneity.  
Treatment Dummies for Regulation 
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Dummies for the existence of a reference price system (RPS) and generic substitution  are 
used as an additional control for the impact of regulation. Although the sign of the parameter 
estimates for these variables indicates their impact on relative speed of adoption for the first 
generic, there is considerable uncertainty regarding these measures. The estimates for RPS and 
generic substitution are presented in the robustness tests. However, regulation is mainly 
identified through its effect on prices due to the significant heterogeneity in the definition of 
RPS and generic substitution incentives.  
Each country employs different criteria to set the reference groups and reference prices. 71% 
of European countries use RPS to control the reimbursement level of medicines (Perry 2006). 
The reference groups can be defined at three levels: 1) the active ingredient (e.g. Belgium, 
France, Italy and Portugal); 2) pharmacological class (e.g. in Poland); 3) therapeutic subgroup 
(e.g., Germany and Netherlands). The reference price can be set at the price of the cheapest 
generic (e.g. Italy and Poland); at the median price of all medicines in the group (e.g. 
Netherlands); highest price of available generic medicines (e.g. Portugal). RPS is more 
successful in promoting generic use if the price difference between generics and branded 
drugs is high; RPS is less effective in generic promotion when prices of the originators are 
reduced to reference price levels (Simoens S and de Coster S 2006).   
Similarly, generic substitution is mandatory in some countries whereas it is promoted in 
others, and the incentives for substitution at the pharmacist level vary greatly across countries. 
For example, pharmacists’ remuneration in Portugal and Spain is set as a fixed percentage of 
the public prices; whereas in Italy and Poland the percentage remuneration decreases as prices 
increase. In France and Belgium the absolute pharmacist margin is the same for originators 
and generics. In France, higher discount-levels for generic medicines offer generic substitution 
incentives to pharmacists who capture the discount benefits.  
Market Characteristics and Competition 
Expected Market Size 
Generics have lower profit margins compared to non-generic products and are subject to 
intense price competition. The sustainability of the generic business, therefore, depends on 
capturing a high market share. Ex-ante expected generic sales are a function of branded 
molecule sales prior to launch and expected generic penetration following market entry. 
Therefore, we estimate the expected generic market size as the product of total molecule sales 
prior to generic entry and the average market share captured by generics, where the average is 
calculated over all off-patent molecules with. Previous studies have ignored the differentials in 
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generic market penetration and have predominantly used branded sales as a proxy for expected 
sales. Market size is estimated both in USD($) and IMS standard units (SU11).  
Market Structure and Competition 
Once manufacturing infrastructure is established, the marginal cost of producing generic drugs 
is relatively low and switching to another molecule is relatively easy (except for certain 
formulations that are difficult to manufacture).  Therefore, ex-ante expectations for market 
competition are proxied by the number of generic manufacturers in the destination country. In 
addition, to incorporate relative firm sizes and account for heterogeneity in competition at the 
therapeutic subgroup (ATC4), we define the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (IHH) in each 
ATC4 as the sum of squared market shares of individual generic firms. A high IHH value is an 
indication of little potential competition in the generic sector, assuming the most imminent 
competitors of the first generic entrant are incumbents of other active ingredients in the same 
therapeutic subgroup.  
 
3.3.2  Internal Environment 
Firm Characteristics 
In a fierce price-competition environment, lower costs result in higher profit margins. 
Globalization of generic firms, especially from emerging markets, is increasing the pressure 
for lower costs. Achieving economies of scale through consolidation of manufacturing, 
administrative and marketing functions across firms helps reduce unit costs and improve profit 
margins. Mergers and acquisitions reduce firm volatility by complementing product lines with 
new medicines; also, scale economies or higher firm size reduce the financial risks associated 
with litigation and launch risk. Geographical diversification spreads out business and 
regulatory risks across markets reducing business volatility (Karwal 2006). We control for 
heterogeneity in firm size by quarterly local and global firm sales, and global reach of the firm 
proxied by the number of markets in which the firm has sales (across the 20 countries in the 
dataset). Economies of scope in the pharmaceutical industry exist when it is more efficient to 
develop or commercialize a drug by one firm rather than several different firms because of 
knowledge spillovers across different products.  
 
Molecule Characteristics 
                                                 
11 IMS standard unit is the smallest dose for each form, for example, one tablet, one capsule, or 5 ml of liquid 
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Therapeutically important molecules diffuse internationally quicker and to a wider set of 
markets. These molecules offer a higher market potential for generic entrants not only because 
of the volume effect but also because of price mark-ups offered to innovative products. The 
total number of markets in which the molecule has launched is used as a proxy for relative 
therapeutic importance. In addition, median sales over 1999-2008 and annual sales of the 
molecule (USD$) are used as additional proxies to control for molecule heterogeneity.  
The evidence regarding brand loyalty on generic entry is mixed. Rudholm (2001) finds that a 
longer monopoly period reduces entry whereas Grabowski and Vernon (1992) found no 
significant effect of patent protection duration. Due to lack of information about protection 
expiry dates of molecules, this study cannot directly control for the exclusivity period in each 
market.  However, launch delays (time elapse between the first global launch date and local 
launch date) of originator products are used as a control for the monopoly period loss in each 
market. The higher the delay, the shorter is the period available for building brand loyalty.  
4  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The empirical strategy adopts different economic specifications to detect potential bias in 
parameter estimates and test for the robustness of estimates under different assumptions 
regarding the underlying hazard.  Regressions are estimated by two most-commonly used 
discrete-time duration analysis methods: i) cloglog regression, and ii) logit regression. 
Duration dependence is specified parametrically as a function of time t elapsed since risk 
onset, and semi-parametrically by including monthly interval dummies following risk onset.  
We estimate the hazard of generic adoption in each market following the first global launch of 
a generic copy with the same active ingredient. All regressions control for the lag of the 
originator molecule as well as heterogeneity in anatomic therapeutic categories (ATC4s) and 
country of launch. Time trends are captured by including dummies for calendar years. Errors 
are clustered by molecule-country to account for correlation between the errors of the same 
molecule-country pair. All molecules used have launched for the first time after 1993, which 
accounts of changing dynamics after the creation of the European Union. The hypotheses 
tested in the empirical analysis are summarized in Table A.4.  
4.1  Parametric Duration Dependence  
Table 1 presents the marginal effects (dy/dx) for the parametric duration dependence 
specification 20( ) ln( )h t t t= + .  Marginal effects and coefficient estimates are very close or 
identical across cloglog and logit parameter estimates. The coefficient estimates for cloglog 
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and logit (not reported for brevity) are very close to each other, implying that the hazard of 
launch on average is small. As expected, in cases where the coefficients are not exactly 
identical, logit estimates are marginally higher than the cloglog estimates. 
Estimates suggest significant generic price effect on the hazard of generic adoption; the higher 
the expected generic price the higher the hazard of first generic adoption in individual 
markets. This effect is robust across different model specifications and to the inclusion or 
exclusion of calendar year dummies. The significance of the price effect is higher when 
calendar year dummies are excluded, which could be an indication of the fact that calendar 
year dummies capture some of the variation in expected generic prices (generic prices are 
pushed downward over time either due to competition or regulation).  
The marginal effect of log expected generic prices on the hazard of first generic launch is on 
the order of 0.002. Considering the average price level of 21.13 $/SU across markets, an 
increase of one standard deviation (86.73 $/SU) in expected generic prices increases 
probability of launch by approximately 0.8% 12. Similarly, the marginal effect of log average 
branded prices is 0.002. Increase of one standard unit in branded prices increases probability 
of launch by 0.8%13 (mean branded price is 28.97 $/SU and standard deviation is 119.65 
$/SU).  
Expected market size in dollars is significant across all specifications. The marginal effect of 
log expected market size for generics (in USD$) varies from 0.002 to 0.004 depending on 
whether calendar year dummies are included or not. Overall, an increase of one standard 
deviation in the expected generic market size increases hazard of launch by 1.4%-2.8%14 (the 
mean of the expected market size of observations used in the regressions is 472,723.3$ with a 
standard deviation of 3,255,101$). Expected market size in SUs, on the other hand, is only 
significant when calendar year dummies are excluded.  
                                                 
12 ( ) ( ) ( )ln 186.728 86.728 86.728
ln ln
y y p y
p p p p p
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= ⋅ = ⋅∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ( )( )
186.728 0.002 .008 ~ 0.8%
21.125
= =  
13 ( ) ( )( )1 1119.646 . 119.646 0.002 . 0.008 ~ 0.8%
ln 28.971b b
y
p p
∂ = =∂  
14 ( ) ( )( )1 13255101 . 3255101 0.002 . 0.014 ~ 1.4%
ln 472723.3
y
MSize MSize
∂ = =∂   
     ( ) ( )( )1 13255101 . 3255101 0.004 . 0.028 ~ 2.8%
ln 472723.3
y
MSize MSize
∂ = =∂  
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The parameter estimate for the effect of generic competition is also highly sensitive to the 
inclusion or exclusion of calendar year dummies. When macro trends are incorporated with 
calendar year dummies, the higher the number of competitors the higher is the hazard of 
launch. On the other hand, the number of competitors significantly increases hazard of launch 
when calendar year dummies are excluded. This switch in the sign of coefficients suggests that 
there could be multicollinearity problems with this variable, which is addressed in Section 4.3.  
Surprisingly, molecule and firm effects show no robust statistical significance. Marginal 
effects of global molecule sales alternate from positive to negative values, which could again 
be an indication of issues with multicollinearity. On the other hand, marginal effects of global 
firm sales is consistently positive across different specifications, which suggests that firm 
scale positively affects the speed of adoption (significance level is 0.075).  
There is robust evidence that the hazard of launch is concave in the number of months elapsed 
since risk onset. The variable t indicates the number of months elapsed since the first global 
generic launch of the originator molecule. Overall, comparing the information criteria 
statistics across different specifications indicates that specifications with calendar year 
dummies provide a better fit compared with the specifications that exclude calendar year 
dummies.  
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Table 1. Parametric Duration Dependence : Marginal Effects for Base Case Cloglog and Logit Estimates for First Generic Launch 
With Calendar Year Dummies No Calendar Year Dummies 
CLOGLOG LOGIT  CLOGLOG  LOGIT  Variables 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Expected Generic Price                         
LMAvgExpPg 0.002* 0.002*  0.002* 0.003*  0.002** 0.004***  0.002** 0.005***   
 (log expected generic prices) [0.0006] [0.0011]  [0.0007] [0.0011]  [0.0007] [0.0013]  [0.0007] [0.0013]   
LMAvg_Pb    0.002*    0.002*    0.002**    0.002** 
 (log branded prices, $/SU)    [0.0006]    [0.0007]    [0.0007]    [0.0007] 
medRatioPgPb    0.007    0.008    -0.018    -0.02 
 (generic-branded price ratio)     [0.0155]     [0.0160]     [0.0190]     [0.0192] 
Expected Market Size                         
ExpMarketSizeUSD 0.002**   0.002**   0.004***   0.004***    
 (expected market size, in $) [0.0008]   [0.0008]   [0.0010]   [0.0010]    
ExpMarketSizeSU   0.001    0.001    0.002*    0.003**   
(expected market size, SUs)   [0.0008]    [0.0008]    [0.0010]    [0.0010]   
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_     0.002*    0.002**    0.003***    0.003*** 
 (molecule sales in country, $)    [0.0008]    [0.0008]    [0.0009]    [0.0009] 
 avgGenShare_USD_       0.000    0    0.002***    0.002*** 
 (avg Generic Share in $)     [0.0003]     [0.0003]     [0.0003]     [0.0003] 
Competition                         
NumGenFirmMed -0.032 -0.032 -0.031 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 0.127*** 0.131*** 0.100*** 0.129*** 0.133*** 0.101*** 
 (number of Generic Firms) [0.0175] [0.0176] [0.0175] [0.0180] [0.0180] [0.0179] [0.0184] [0.0185] [0.0169] [0.0186] [0.0187] [0.0170] 
Molecule Characteristics                         
ln_lag_yrs 0.002* 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.002* 0.001 0 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 
 (launch delay of originator) [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0012] 
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.002 0 -0.001 -0.002 0 -0.001 
 (log global molecule sales, $) [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0011] 
Firm Characteristics                         
ln_globalFirmSales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (log global firm sales in $) [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] 
Time Since Risk Onset                         
t 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
 ln(t2)    -0.006*** - - - - - - - - -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
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0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
  [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0007] 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model Stats                         
Number of Observations 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 
Log Likelihood -2218.21 -2221.42 -2218.47 -2220.04 -2223.32 -2220.28 -2326.57 -2332.77 -2306.01 -2327.9 -2334.26 -2307.48 
chi2 737.92 736.01 749.44 681.63 681.78 687.45 418.16 406.76 447.5 380.01 371.24 413.37 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Akaike Info Criteria  4530.422 4536.85 4534.93 4534.08 4540.65 4538.56 4731.13 4743.53 4694.02 4733.79 4746.53 4696.95 
Bayesian Info Criteria 4901.17 4907.59 4921.46 4904.83 4911.4 4925.08 5038.77 5051.17 5017.44 5041.44 5054.17 5020.37 
 
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets). Marginal effects (dy/dx) reported .  
    Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported.  
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4.2  Non-Parametric Duration Dependence  
Non-parametric approach to duration dependence obviates the need for prior assumptions 
regarding the functional form of the hazard with respect to time. Estimation is carried out by 
including dummies for each month following the risk onset and specifying noconstant option in 
Stata. This approach essentially assumes a constant hazard rate during each monthly interval. As a 
robustness check, all non-parametric specifications were also estimated with cloglog and logit 
regressions.  
Parameter estimates using non-parametric duration dependence are presented in Table A.5 in the 
Appendix. The signs of the coefficients are on broadly consistent with results of the 
corresponding parametric specification. The higher the expected generic price and market size, 
the higher is the hazard of adoption. In regression runs with no calendar year dummies, a higher 
Pg/Pb ratio is significantly associated with a lower hazard rate. This is expected because once 
generic prices are controlled for; a wider price differential between generic and branded 
alternatives gives a competitive edge to the generic manufacturer due to significantly lower 
prices. This effect, however, is not significant when macro time trends are incorporated by 
calendar year dummies. Similarly, the higher the aggregate generic share in the destination 
country the higher is the hazard of adoption; however, the effect is significant when year 
dummies are excluded.  
The impact of competition, proxied by the number of generic firms, is not robust and shows the 
same trend as in the parametric duration specification. Launch hazard is decreasing in the number 
of generic firms, as expected, when calendar year dummies are included. Excluding year 
dummies reverses the effect of potential competition. The signs of the coefficients for molecule 
and firm effects are robust in the non-parametric specification results. The coefficients of 
therapeutic importance (global molecule sales) are positive and statistically significant in the 
second specification whereas the coefficients of global firm sales (scale effect) are consistently 
positive across different specifications, however, not statistically significant. 
Akaike and Bayesian information criteria for non-parametric specifications are much higher 
compared to the parametric duration specifications. This can be explained by the fact that the 
number of estimated parameters increases considerably due to the inclusion of 117 dummies for 
each month (from 1999 Q1 to 2008 Q3) in the non-parametric specification, whereas the 
parametric specification requires the estimation of only two parameters for duration dependence, t 
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and ( )2ln t . As in the cases with parametric estimation, information criteria are lowest in 
specifications where calendar year dummies are included. Overall, this suggests that parametric 
duration specification with calendar year dummies provides a better fit to the data. Small 
difference in parameter estimates and information criteria for cloglog and logit regressions 
suggests that both perform equally well because hazard of adoption is small.   
4.3  Multicollinearity 
Given the swings in some coefficient signs (e.g. number of generic firms) in the base case 
estimates, we tested for potential issues of multicollinearity by computing the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs). Ideally, VIFs should be smaller than 1015.  Multicollinearity could result in several 
problems including: 1) wide swings in the parameter estimates with small changes in the data; 2) 
high standard errors and low significance; 3) wrong coefficients signs and implausible 
magnitudes. 
VIFs were calculated by first running an ordinary least squares regression and then calculating the 
VIF by the Stata command estat VIF. VIF estimates are presented in Table A.6 in the Appendix. 
The variance inflation factor for the proxy of competition (number of generic firms) is 244.7 and 
the mean value is 16.6, which indicates as expected a severe multicollinearity problem. When the 
normalized Herfindahl-Hirshman Index within therapeutic categories is used instead of the 
number of generic firms as a proxy for competition the multicollinearity problem subsides and the 
mean VIF reduces to 2.9 (see Table A.7). It should be noted that although the VIF factors for 
calendar year dummies is less than 10, they remain predominantly above 5, which may further 
explain some of the sensitivity in the coefficients with respect to whether calendar year dummies 
are included in the regressions.  
Marginal effects dy/dx for the base case specifications are re-estimated after changing the control 
for competition from number of generic firms to the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(IHH) (see Table 2). Akaike and Bayesian information criteria indicate that the new specification 
with IHH provide a better fit overall. Therefore, the robustness tests in Section 5 use IHH as the 
control variable for competition to avoid problems with multicollinearity.  
                                                 
15 http://www.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats2/l11.pdf 
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Table 2. Parametric Duration Dependence: Marginal Effects using Herfindahl Index as a proxy for competition 
with calendar year dummies no calendar year dummies 
cloglog cloglog cloglog logit logit logit cloglog cloglog cloglog logit logit logit Variables 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Expected Generic Price             
LMAvgExpPg 0.002*** 0.003**  0.002*** 0.003**  0.003*** 0.005***  0.003*** 0.005***  
  [0.0006] [0.0010]  [0.0006] [0.0010]  [0.0006] [0.0012]  [0.0007] [0.0012]  
LMAvg_Pb   0.002***   0.002***   0.002***   0.002*** 
    [0.0006]   [0.0006]   [0.0006]   [0.0006] 
medRatioPgPb   0.000   0.004   -0.022   -0.022 
    [0.0133]   [0.0136]   [0.0147]   [0.0151] 
Expected Market Size             
ExpMarketSizeUSD 0.002*   0.002**   0.004***   0.004***   
  [0.0007]   [0.0007]   [0.0009]   [0.0009]   
ExpMarketSizeSU  0.001   0.001   0.003***   0.003***  
   [0.0007]   [0.0007]   [0.0009]   [0.0009]  
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_   0.002*   0.002**   0.003***   0.003*** 
    [0.0007]   [0.0008]   [0.0008]   [0.0008] 
avgGenShare_USD_   0.000   0.000   0.001***   0.001*** 
    [0.0002]   [0.0002]   [0.0002]   [0.0002] 
Competition             
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
  [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] 
Molecule Characteristics             
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 
  [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0010] 
ln_lag_yrs 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 
  [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] 
Firm Characteristics             
ln_globalFirmSales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0003] 
Time Since Risk Onset             
t 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Ln(t2) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
-
0.007*** 
-
0.007*** 
-
0.008*** 
-
0.008*** -0.007*** 
  [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] 
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Heterogeneity             
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Model Stats             
Number of Observations 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 
Log likelihood -2083.37 -2086.36 -2083.47 -2082.67 -2085.94 -2082.87 -2192.41 -2199.68 -2170.06 -2194.79 -2202.22 -2172.71 
chi2 798.35 798.11 817.25 668 669.02 682.63 617.43 604.45 615.58 521.4 510.85 530.79 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Akaike Info Criteria 4260.73 4266.72 4264.94 4259.34 4265.87 4263.75 4462.82 4477.37 4422.13 4467.58 4482.45 4427.42 
Bayesian Info Criteria 4631.48 4637.47 4651.46 4630.09 4636.62 4650.28 4770.46 4785.01 4745.55 4775.23 4790.09 4750.84 
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets). Marginal effects (dy/dx) reported.  
           Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported.  
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5  ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Robustness checks were carried out by using different proxies for each control variable 
(regulation, market size, competition, firm and molecule characteristic). As in the base case 
analysis, both cloglog and logit estimates were calculated with parametric and non-parametric 
duration dependence. We present only parametric results with time trends included as the data 
suggested better overall fit with parametric specification. To avoid multicollinearity problems, 
competition is controlled by the concentration index in the therapeutic subgroup (IHH) rather 
the number of generic manufacturers in the destination market. 
5.1  Regulation  
We tested for the robustness of the generic price effect by using log lagged expected generic 
price and log moving average of expected generic prices over 4 quarters prior to launch16; log 
of expected generic prices (ln_ExpPg) and median generic-branded price ratio (medRatioPgPb); 
the interaction of generic price and time since risk onset; treatment dummies for reference 
pricing systems (RPS) and generic substitution (GenSubst). All regressions controlled for 
market size, competition, molecule and firm effects, launch lag of the originator molecule, 
country, therapeutic group (ATC1) and calendar year effects.  
Estimates are presented in Table A.8 in the Appendix. Higher expected generic prices 
significantly increase the hazard of generic adoption, regardless of whether lagged prices or the 
moving average of expected generic price is used. The effect is robust across cloglog and logit 
regressions. In addition, markets with higher branded prices are associated with significantly 
faster generic adoption; this effect is robust across all specifications. This implies a trade-off in 
depressing branded prices which improves static efficiency during the exclusivity period but 
delays generic market entry and may jeopardize further static efficiency gains post-patent 
expiry. 
The impact of reference pricing schemes (RPS) and generic substitution is tested by treatment 
dummies, on top of the effect of expected generic prices. Evidence suggests that both RPS and 
generic substitution increase the hazard of generic adoption; however, only the coefficient for 
generic substitution under non-parametric specification is significant. As stated before, 
treatment dummies for these policies should be interpreted with caution as there exists 
                                                 
16 Moving averages are defined with the weights of 0.4, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1 for the last four quarters 
26 
 
substantial heterogeneity across countries in the implementation of reference pricing and 
generic substitution schemes.  
5.2   Market Size 
We tested for the robustness of market size effects using the following proxies: expected 
generic market size (in USD$ and SU); log moving average of molecule sales (in USD$ and 
SU) and log lagged molecule sales (in USD$ and SU). Expected generic market size was 
defined as the product of molecule sales and the average generic share over molecules in the 
country. Moving averages were defined over four lagged quarters to smooth out the variability 
in molecule sales (weights used for the first to fourth lags are 0.4, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1).  
Expected generic market size in USD$ is significant across all specifications (Table A.9). 
Expected generic market size in SUs has a positive coefficient in all specifications but is 
significant only when calendar year dummies are excluded. The significance of the market size 
in the hazard of generic adoption highlights the importance of integrating demand-side policies 
(such as physician budgets with rewards for surpluses and sanctions for deficits and generic 
substitution schemes that financially reward the pharmacist) with supply-side policies (price 
controls) to promote generic adoption and the sustainability of the generic sector.  
5.3  Market Structure and Competition 
Market structure is captured by the number of generic firms in the country (NumGenFirmMed) 
and squared number of generic firms (firmSqMed) in the country, both divided by the median 
values to obtain meaningful standard errors. Competition at the therapeutic category level is 
controlled for by normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index for generic firms and the number of 
substitute molecules in the ATC4 category (NumbMolCtryAtc4_) and the by ATC4-country 
and quarter.  
Concentration index in the ATC4 has a significant effect (at the 0.001 level) both in cloglog or 
logit regression (Table A.10). The higher the concentration of generic firms in the therapeutic 
category, the higher the hazard of generic launch. This suggests that strong generic competition 
at the therapeutic level constitutes a barrier to generic entry.  
We test the impact of the number of molecules in each subgroup (defined quarterly) to account 
for the closest possible therapeutic substitution effects. A limitation of this variable is that it 
does not incorporate possible substitution from molecules in the same pharmacologic group 
(ATC3). Results indicate that inter-molecular competition (number of active ingredients) within 
a therapeutic subgroup is not a significant determinant of generic entry decisions.  
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The coefficient of the squared number of firms is negative in all specifications, which suggests 
a concave relationship between the hazard of first generic launch and the number of potential 
competitors. However, the effect is not statistically significant.  
5.4  Molecule Heterogeneity 
Proxies used to capture molecule heterogeneity include: global reach of the molecule (the 
number of countries in which the molecule has launched); annual sales (USD$) of the molecule 
in each country; median sales (USD$) of the molecule in each country during 1999 Q1 – 2008 
Q3; percentage molecule sales in the retail sector and launch delay of the originator (in log yrs) 
following the global launch of the new molecule.  
Estimates for the global reach and annual or median sales of the molecule are negative but not 
significant .The effect of global molecule sales is not significant in either of the specifications. 
In all specifications local sales (expected market size) remain as a significant determinant of 
generic adoption probability. Contrary to our initial hypothesis, these estimates suggest that 
molecule characteristics are of secondary importance in generic launch strategies once we 
account for expected price and market size. Also, these estimates are indicative of generic 
launch being more locally oriented as opposed to patent-protected molecules that rely on global 
adoption to recoup R&D investments. Results suggest that the exclusivity period of the 
originator affects generic entry decisions. The sign for the originator delay is robustly positive 
across all specifications, which is consistent with the hypothesis that a shorter exclusivity 
period results in faster generic entry.   
The percentage of sales in the retail channel for each molecule is used as a proxy to control for 
the purchasing power of the demand side. Hospital purchases are usually determined by 
tendering with a high concentration among purchase groups. For example, hospitals and trusts 
in the UK group together to negotiate price reductions with suppliers17. In addition, hospital 
prescriptions may be governed by formularies that restrict presentations of drugs to be selected 
within a therapeutic category in order to achieve bulk discounts.  
In general, prices in the hospital sector are lower compared to the retail sector because brand 
recognition is usually weak; single-providers are preferred for multi-source products, and cost 
is the main driver in contract tenders / bidding process18. By restricting presentations of drugs to 
                                                 
17 The NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency (PASA) coordinates the tendering process. The supplier with a 
competitive tender (i.e. competitive prices) is selected to supply a given product at the specified price whenever it 
receives an order from one of the hospital trusts taking part in the tendering process  
18 http://www.publications.doh.gov.uk/generics/oxera_report_a6.htm 
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be selected within a therapeutic category hospitals may negotiate substantial price reductions 
off the list price of medicines. With this control variable, a significant number of observations 
are lost because some countries have only retail channel data19. There is no robust evidence 
regarding the share of retail sales. Only in non-parametric specifications there is significant 
evidence that a higher share of retail sales increases the hazard of first generic launch, which is 
in line with the findings of Magazzini et al. (2004) who observe that the size of the hospital 
sector has a negative impact on generic market share in USA, UK, Germany, and France. This 
finding provides some insight into the repercussions of extending the use of tender-type 
systems in the retail sector. Wider use of tender-based purchasing in the retail sector would 
reduce incentives for generic entry or promote mergers and acquisitions further limiting generic 
competition.  
5.5  Firm Characteristics 
The robustness of the impact of firm heterogeneity was tested using the following proxies: log 
local and global sales of the firm, global reach of the corporation (the number of geographical 
markets in which the firm has sales) and firm’s molecule diversity (number of molecules the 
firm has on sale in the global market) as a proxy for scope effects. 
Paradoxically, firm characteristics do not have a robust or significant effect on the hazard of 
generic adoption. Both for parametric and non-parametric specifications, local and global firm 
sales have a positive effect on the hazard of launch if calendar year dummies are excluded. 
When calendar year dummies are included firm sales have a negative coefficient. However, 
firm sales coefficients are not significant. Only the parametric specification with no calendar 
year dummies yields positive coefficient estimates for local firm sales. The coefficient of firm’s 
number of molecules is small but is robustly positive across different specifications, and 
significant for parametric specification with no calendar year dummies. Global reach of the 
corporation, i.e. the number of geographical markets in which the firm has sales, has positive 
coefficient estimate in 6 out of 8 different specifications; however, the effect is not significant.  
Local firm sales seem to be better proxies compared to global firm sales in predicting the 
hazard of generic launch, which suggests generic launch strategies are more locally oriented 
compared to research oriented branded manufactures that aim for global optimization in 
international launch strategies to recoup costly R&D outlays. The significant importance of 
                                                 
19 Countries with only retail-level data are Belgium, Greece, Spain, Sweden, South Africa and Turkey. Swedish 
data is combined sales for retail and hospital sectors. For the US, retail sales are assumed to be composed of food 
stores, drugstores and mail sales. 
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local firm sales may indicate advantages in the tendering or price negotiation procedures with 
bulk purchasers such as hospitals. This also indirectly suggests that economies of scale/scope in 
the generic sector has a less significant role compared to the research intensive sector where the 
scale of R&D and marketing outlays makes firm size a competitive advantage.    
A summary table for the hypotheses tested, and a comparison of the expected and estimated 
coefficient signs is presented in Table A.4 in the Appendix. 
 
6  CONLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has attempted to investigate how regulation affects the relative adoption speed of 
first generic products across the OECD. We use product-level price and volume information to 
analyse generic adoption speed across the OECD in the past two decades (1999-2008), 
controlling for other influential factors such as market competition and firm heterogeneity. The 
panel data structure exploits variation both over time and over country-molecule pairs in 
discrete-time duration regressions with cloglog and logit. The evidence from our empirical 
analysis provides robust evidence suggestive of the effect higher expected generic prices exert 
on the hazard of first generic launch across the OECD. That is, adoption is found to be faster in 
higher priced markets. This is consistent with the trade-off between innovation and cost cutting 
competition, or static-dynamic efficiency trade-off in the pharmaceutical industry. A second 
findings indicates that expected generic market size (in USD$) is a significant determinant of 
generic launch, controlling for price, competition, firm and molecule characteristics.  
Ex-ante expectations about competition also have a significant effect on generic launch 
strategies; with a highly fragmented therapeutic market is indicative of reduced incentives to 
generic entry. This is in contrast to the effect of competition in the patent-protected sector 
where competition has been associated with higher rates of entry (Kyle 2007). Our 
interpretation is that generics are commodity products with little room for differentiation that 
compete solely on price, whilst patent-protected products compete in quality and other 
important characteristics that allow for product-differentiation. New molecules are usually 
improved versions of older molecules and can capture market share from already existing 
molecules. In the case of generics, however, as competition makes the market more fragmented, 
prices and market share potential adjust accordingly.   
Unexpectedly, molecule or firm characteristics do not have a robust effect across different 
specifications although base case results indicate that firm scale positively affects speed of 
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generic adoption. Local firm sales are found to be better predictors of the hazard of generic 
adoption compared to global firm sales. This is consistent with the idea that generic competition 
is based on either a low-cost base or differentiation in forms that are difficult to manufacture or 
market (Gorka 2009), whilst global branded competition exhibits a higher  strategic advantage 
in overcoming the barriers to entry. The increasing significance of firm size is evidenced by the 
recent growth in mergers and acquisitions across generic manufacturers.  
Adoption lag for the originator product relative to the first global launch is significantly and 
robustly associated with later generic entry. This is consistent with the observation that markets 
with higher prices adopt generics faster on average, and more specifically that  free pricing 
tends to conflate lower administrative delays, and products tend to be adopted earlier in those 
countries. Given the potential savings offered by generics to health systems, improving access 
to generics and reducing adoption delays both for innovative molecules and generics should be 
a key goal in markets that are late adopters.  
. A natural extension of this analysis is to empirically analyse determinants of generic diffusion 
in individual markets. Major price-controlled pharmaceutical markets such as France, Spain, 
Italy and Japan not only suffer from launch lags but also have very low penetration rates in the 
off-patent sector, less than 20% vs. over 70% in the US (European Generic Medicines 
Association 2007; Gorka 2009). Integration of demand-side measures such as generic 
substitution with supply-side measures is essential to promote a sustainable generic sector in 
these markets. The analysis could be further extended to assess the impact of other demand-side 
measures, such as risk sharing through co-payments, on generic entry and timing of generic 
availability. 
 
31 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A.1 Findings from the Literature on generic drug entry  
Risk Factor Observed Effect Evidence from Author(s) 
Pre-entry 
market size and 
expected profits 
Increases speed and extent of generic entry  
US, UK, 
Germany, Spain, 
Sweden, Japan 
Grabowski, Vernon  92; Scott Morton 99, 00; 
Reiffen and Ward 05; Saha 06; Moreno-Torres 09; 
Appelt 09; Iizuka 09 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Economies of scope (entry in several markets; number of form 
strengths for a given molecule) US, Japan Bae 97; Scott Morton 99; Iizuka 09 
Drug 
characteristics 
• Drugs for chronic conditions exhibit a higher entry rate  
• Entry dynamics depend on therapeutic class US, Japan 
Bae 97; Scott Morton 00; Saha, Grabowski 06; 
Iizuka 09 
• Reference pricing restrains generic entry by reducing generic 
profits (the empirical evidence is weak)  Spain, Sweden  
Moreno-Torres 09; Ekelund 01; Konigbauer 06; 
Rudholm 01; Danzon & Chao 00  Price regulation/ 
Reimbursement • Higher price premium for branded drugs over generics increases 
generic share 
US 
 Hurwitz, Caves 88 
Competition/ 
Market structure 
Slower if market is highly competitive (importance of generic vs. 
branded competition is market-dependent) 
• Number of generic incumbents negatively affects extent of entry in 
Spain 
• Impact of branded competition is not clear  [US and Japanese 
evidence suggests slower entry with increasing number of 
competitor molecules; Magazzini (2004) finds counter evidence] 
Spain, Japan; 
France, Germany, 
UK, US 
Iizuka 09; Moreno-Torres 09; Saha 06; Bae 97; 
Scott Morton 00; Magazzini 04 
Proportion of 
hospital sales  
Market Dependent. Increases generic entry in the US but not in 
Japan; a study on France, Germany, UK,US indicates size of hospital 
sales has negative impact on generic shares 
US, Japan; France, 
Germany, UK Iizuka 09; Scott Morton 00; Magazzini 04 
Branded firm 
strategies Partnerships and agreements deter entry  US, Canada Hollis 03; Reiffen 05; Berndt et al. 07; Reiffen 07 
• More entrants if patent protection period is shorter Sweden Rudholm 01 
Mixed Evidence regarding Pre-Patent Expiry Brand Advertising 
• Higher promotion during patent exclusivity preserves brand shares 
(brand loyalty) 
 
US Hurwitz, Caves 88 
• Pre-patent advertising declines with patent expiry; no significant 
effect on generic entry US 
Caves, Whinston 91; Grabwoski, Vernon 92; 
Ellison, Ellison 07 
Goodwill Stock 
of the Branded 
Product 
Advertising in Generic Industry 
• Not effective since little potential for differentiation 
 
US Scherer 00; Scott-Morton 00 
 
32 
 
Discrete Time Survival Analysis 
In practice, it has been shown that if the hazard rate is relatively small and cloglog and logistic 
hazard models share the same duration dependence and covariate vector, then the estimates they 
yield are similar.  This can be illustrated by writing the hazard rates in each model as a power series 
and using ( )exp t jG γ= + z β (see Table A.2). When the probability of failure in each interval is 
small (i.e. h ≤ 0.10 or less), then  
t jγ + z β= ( )log log 1 2.25h⎡ ⎤− − ≤ −⎣ ⎦  in the cloglog model, and  t jγ + z β= log 2.201
h
h
⎡ ⎤ ≤ −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦  in the 
logistic model. In this case, ( )exp t jG γ= + z β = ( )exp 2.2 0.10≈ − ≈  and terms of the order 2G and 
higher are close to zero and ( )1 h−  can be approximated by ( )1 G− both for the cloglog and logit 
model. In the instances where the hazard is small, therefore, the parameters of the logistic model and 
the proportional hazard model will be nearly equal (Abbott 1985; Jenkins 2005).  
Table A.2 Comparison of Cologlog and Logit Models  
 Cloglog model Logit model 
t jγ + z β  = ( )log log 1 h⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦  log 1
h
h
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦  
1 – h  = 
2 3 ( 1)1 ... ...
2! 3! !
n nG G GG
n
−− + − +  2 31 ... ( 1) ...n nG G G G− + − + −  
( ), jh t z  = ( )( )1 exp exp t jγ− − + z β  11 exp( )t jγ+ − − z β  
i
h
z
∂ ∂ = ( ){ } ( )exp exp expj t j t iγ γ β− + +z β z β 2exp( )1 exp( )
i j t
j t
β γ
γ
+=
⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦
z β
z β
 
Note: ( )exp t jG γ= + z β  
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Table A.3 Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics  
Expected Price Description Level N mean Std.dev min max 
ln_Pb Log of NonGeneric Retail Price of the Molecule Ctry-Mol-Qrt 521376 0.147 2.104 -7.055 7.739 
LMAvg_Pb Log of Moving Average of NonGeneric Retail Price of the Molecule Ctry-Mol-Qrt 462450 0.138 2.103 -5.622 7.714 
medRatioPgPb Expected Price Ratio Pgen/Pnongen Ctry-Qrt 614538 0.765 0.150 0.220 1.035 
LMAvgExpPg Log Moving Average of Expected Generic Price [Log Pb * medRatioPgPb ] Ctry-Mol-Qrt 462450 -0.158 2.086 -5.796 7.458 
ln_ExpPg Log Expected Generic Price [Log Pb*medRatioPgPb   ]  Ctry-Mol-Qrt 521376 -0.148 2.087 -7.273 7.550 
RPS Treatment Dummy for Reference Pricing System Ctry-Qrt 816660 0.551 0.497 0 1 
GenSubst Tratement Dummy for Generic Substitution Ctry-Qrt 775827 0.677 0.467 0 1 
Market Size Description Level N mean Std.dev min max 
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_ Log Moving Average of Molecule Sales in the Country ($) Ctry-Mol-Qrt 525018 6.152 2.738 -7.012 14.407 
LMAvg_SU_molCtr_ Log Moving Average of Molecule Sales in the Country (SU) Ctry-Mol-Qrt 525057 6.068 3.311 -6.908 13.789 
ln_USD_moleculeCtry_i Log Molecule Sales in the Country ($) Ctry-Mol-Qrt 590559 6.076 2.824 -7.650 14.412 
ln_SU_moleculeCtry_i Log Molecule Sales in the Country (SU) Ctry-Mol-Qrt 590622 5.981 3.385 -6.908 13.886 
avgGenShare_USD_ Average Generic ($) Share Ctry-Qrt 816660 38.526 12.104 6.614 64.023 
ExpMarketSizeSU Expected Market Size (SU) Ctry-Mol-Qrt 525057 9.795 3.342 -3.715 18.028 
ExpMarketSizeUSD Expected Market Size ($) [Log MAvg_USD_molCtr * avgGenShare_USD ] Ctry-Mol-Qrt 525018 9.764 2.758 -3.911 18.507 
Competition Description Level N mean Std.dev min max 
NumbMolCtryAtc4_ Number of Molecules in the ATC4 category (number of substitute molecules) 
Ctry-Qrt-
Atc4 296010 10.040 10.600 0 191 
NumGenFirm Number of Generic Firms in the Country Ctry-Qrt 816660 143.778 77.369 47 380 
NumGenFirmMed    Number of Generic Firms in the Country/Median Ctry-Qrt 816660 1.188 0.639 0.388 3.140 
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firmSqMed Squared number of generic firms in the Ctr/Median of Firms squared Ctry-Qrt 816660 1.821 2.195 0.151 9.863 
IHHatc4_gen Herfindahl Index for Generic Sector  Ctry-Mol-Qrt 296010 4151.811 4056.628 0 10000 
norm_IHHatc4_gen normalized Herfindahl index for generic sector: (IHH_gen-mean)/std dev Ctry-Mol-Qrt 296010 0 1 -1.023 1.442 
Molecule Description Level N mean sd min max 
MolGlobalReach Number of Markets the molecule has launched in Mol 816660 16.779 4.242 2 20 
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ Log Annual Molecule Sales ($) Mol-Year 811260 11.535 2.277 -4.881 16.279 
ln_MolGlobalUSDMedian_ Log Molecule Sales ($) [median of annual sales over 1999-2008] Mol 816660 11.606 2.222 2.908 16.023 
ln_lag_yrs Lag Years of the Branded Version (Local Launch - Global Launch Date) Mol-Ctry 602316 1.279 1.256 -2.554 4.681 
PercRetailUSD_ Percentage retail sales of molecules in each market($) Ctry-Mol-Qrt 388461 71.843 37.543 0 100 
Firm Description Level N mean Std.dev min max 
lnLocalCorpSales Log Local Sales of the Firm Firm-Cty-Qrt 287133 9.690 2.474 -7.078 15.762 
ln_globalFirmSales Log Global Sales of the Firm Firm-Qrt 289110 12.186 3.041 -7.078 16.225 
CorpGlobalReach Number of Markets in which the firm has sales Firm-Qrt 293319 11.837 7.578 0 20 
FirmMolDivAtT_ Firm's number of molecules on sale at time t Firm-Qrt 291291 375.761 310.072 1 1112 
Note: Ctry: Country; Mol: Molecule; Qrt: Quarter 
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Table A.4 Hypotheses tested in the empirical analysis  
Factor Testable Hypotheses Evidence from the Literature Expected Sign of the Coefficient 
Estimated 
Sign  
H1 a: High expected generic prices increase the 
hazard rate (decrease launch lag) for generic products 
No direct empirical 
evidence  
+ Price Coefficient 
(Higher generic prices, controlling for other 
factors, increase expected revenue and 
profitability for generic manufacturers) 
+ 
H1 b.1:  Higher branded prices increase the hazard of 
launch of generic products 
Evidence exists 
+ Pb Coefficient 
(Generic prices may be directly linked to branded 
prices; markets with higher prices tend to have 
higher generic prices ) 
+ 
Regulation 
 
H1 b.2: Generic-branded price ratio Pg/Pb negatively 
affects hazard of launch.  
No evidence on 
timing of generic 
entry 
- Pg/Pb Coefficient 
(Keeping branded price fixed, lower generic 
prices allow generics to capture a higher volume 
share) 
- 
H1 c.1: The higher the branded molecule sales prior to 
generic launch (in $ or SU), the higher the hazard of 
launch 
Empirical evidence 
exists for $ sales of 
branded products 
+ Market Size Coefficient  
(Both the sign of SU and USD sales are expected 
to be positive) 
+ 
Market Size 
H1 c.2: The higher the expected generic market size 
(= branded molecule sales * the average generic share 
in the local market), the higher the hazard of launch 
No direct empirical 
evidence   
+ Expected Market Size Coefficient 
(Market size increases incentives for entry as the 
net present value of entry is increased   ) 
+ 
H1 c.1: A higher number of expected generic 
competitors decreases the hazard of entry 
No evidence 
- Coefficient for number of competitor firms 
(The number of generic entrants has a negative 
impact on expected profits) 
- (concave 
relationship); 
effect not 
robustly 
significant 
H1 c.2: The higher the number of substitute molecules 
in the therapeutic class, the lower is the hazard rate No evidence    
- Coefficient for Substitute Molecules 
(Either reference pricing or competition will drive 
prices and potential profits down) 
+ ; effect not 
significant 
Competition 
& Market 
Structure 
H1 c.3: The higher the Herfindahl concentration index 
of generic manufacturers at the therapeutic class level, 
the lower the hazard rate   
No evidence + Concentration Coefficient  (Less fierce price competition in ) + 
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+ Coefficient for Molecule’s Global Reach 
(Molecules with wider global diffusions have 
higher therapeutic importance)  
- but not 
significant 
H1d.1: Generic entry for therapeutically/commercially 
important molecules is faster (higher branded prices 
and higher profit potentials) 
No evidence + Coefficient for Molecule’s Global Sales 
(Hazard of adoption should be higher for 
molecules that have higher sales [therapeutic 
importance and sales are positively correlated]). 
No robust 
evidence 
H1d.2: The longer the lag for the entry of the 
originator molecule, the faster the generic entry 
No evidence 
+ Coefficient for the Lag of the Originator 
(Longer lags imply shorter exclusivity and lower 
brand loyalty) 
+ across 
models; not 
significant 
Molecule 
 
H1d.2: Percentage of molecule sales in the retail 
sector increases hazard of launch 
Contradictory 
+ Coefficient for % Sales in Retail Sector 
(Prices in the hospital sector tend to lower than in 
the retail sector but volume effect could dominate) 
+; significant 
for non-
parametric 
models 
H1 e.1: Firm economies of scope (number of 
molecules in the portfolio)  increase the hazard of 
launch  
Evidence exists 
+ Economies of Scope Coefficient 
(Economies of scope allow lower-cost entry as the 
firm can switch quickly and less costly from one 
product line to another. Knowledge spillovers 
across different product lines may further reduce 
development and entry costs)  
+ and 
significant 
+ Coefficient for Firm’s Global/Local Sales 
(Scale economies allow vertical integration in the 
supply chain and mergers with other firms to 
decrease costs) 
+ for local; 
no robust 
evidence for 
global sales 
Firm 
H1 e.2: Firms’ scale has positive effect on the hazard 
of launch.  
Evidence from the 
branded sector; No 
firm empirical 
evidence exists for 
the generic sector 
+ Coefficient for Firm’s Global Reach 
(A wider global presence indicates potentially 
bigger firm size and higher familiarity with 
diverse regulatory environments) 
+ but not 
significant 
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Table A.5 Non-parametric Duration Dependence: Coefficients for Base Case Cloglog and Logit Estimates for First Generic Launch  
 
With  Calendar Year Dummies No  Calendar Year Dummies 
CLOGLOG LOGIT CLOGLOG LOGIT Coefficient Estimates  
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Expected Generic Price             
LMAvgExpPg 0.052 0.063  0.055* 0.067  0.074** 0.141**  0.076** 0.146**  
  [0.0267] [0.0413]  [0.0282] [0.0435]  [0.0256] [0.0438]  [0.0265] [0.0452]  
LMAvg_Pb   0.051   0.054   0.073**   0.074** 
    [0.0266]   [0.0281]   [0.0248]   [0.0257] 
medRatioPgPb   0.199   0.318   -1.743*   -1.835* 
    [0.6895]   [0.7224]   [0.7777]   [0.8011] 
Expected Market Size             
ExpMarketSizeUSD 0.091**   0.097**   0.187***   0.194***   
  [0.0341]   [0.0365]   [0.0369]   [0.0378]   
ExpMarketSizeSU  0.022   0.022   0.082*   0.086*  
   [0.0305]   [0.0331]   [0.0323]   [0.0334]  
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_    0.087*   0.093*   0.136***   0.142*** 
    [0.0341]   [0.0366]   [0.0351]   [0.0360] 
 avgGenShare_USD_      0.001   -0.002   0.095***   0.097*** 
    [0.0123]   [0.0127]   [0.0110]   [0.0113] 
Competition             
NumGenFirmMed -1.779* -1.818* -1.791* -1.597* -1.627* -1.638* 5.761*** 5.904*** 4.683*** 5.905*** 6.065*** 4.855*** 
  [0.7671] [0.7688] [0.7651] [0.7990] [0.8017] [0.7978] [0.7922] [0.7943] [0.7097] [0.8117] [0.8145] [0.7295] 
Molecule Characteristics             
ln_lag_yrs 0.071 0.065 0.071 0.074 0.067 0.073 0.015 0.004 0.023 0.017 0.005 0.025 
  [0.0372] [0.0371] [0.0372] [0.0390] [0.0388] [0.0390] [0.0353] [0.0348] [0.0349] [0.0363] [0.0357] [0.0361] 
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ 0.029 0.082* 0.033 0.036 0.093* 0.04 0.002 0.082* 0.022 0.005 0.087* 0.026 
  [0.0385] [0.0368] [0.0385] [0.0404] [0.0386] [0.0404] [0.0395] [0.0375] [0.0380] [0.0400] [0.0379] [0.0385] 
Firm Characteristics             
ln_globalFirmSales 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.012 
  [0.0145] [0.0145] [0.0145] [0.0150] [0.0150] [0.0150] [0.0136] [0.0135] [0.0131] [0.0139] [0.0138] [0.0134] 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Monthly Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
38 
 
Model Stats             
Number of observations 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 
Log Likelihood -3302.54 -3306.22 -3302.93 -3294.88 -3298.66 -3295.2 -3505.01 -3516.33 -3465.35 -3503.12 -3514.59 -3463.26 
chi2 14057.04 14280.89 14313.13 12763.67 12976.81 12988.19 17497.36 18261.92 18189.47 16603.75 17342.02 17238.23 
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Akaike Info Criteria 6927.08 6934.44 6931.86 6911.76 6919.31 6916.4 7316.02 7338.65 7240.7 7312.23 7335.19 7236.52 
Bayesian Info Criteria 8315.52 8322.88 8337.55 8300.2 8307.75 8322.09 8635.47 8658.1 8577.4 8631.68 8654.64 8573.22 
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).  
Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported 
LMAvg: Log Moving Average 
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Table A.6 Variance Inflation Factors with number of generic firms in the market 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF  Variable VIF 1/VIF 
NumGenFirmMed 244.7 0.0041  sequence 5.34 0.1872  country == SWEDEN 2.22 0.4514 
country == US 187.5 0.0053  country == BELGIUM 5.09 0.1964  ATC1 == C 2.21 0.4527 
country == GERMANY 102.13 0.0098  year == 2000 4.93 0.2029  ATC1 == M 2.13 0.4690 
country == ITALY 34.07 0.0293  ln_sequenceSq    4.22 0.2370  country == NETHERLANDS 2.01 0.4979 
country == UK 14.49 0.0690  country == CANADA 4.09 0.2443  ATC1 == R 1.89 0.5297 
country == POLAND 13.04 0.0767  year == 2007 3.94 0.2535  ATC1 == J 1.86 0.5370 
country == SPAIN 11.31 0.0884  ExpMarketSizeUSD 3.84 0.2604  country == BELGIUM 1.85 0.5394 
country == GREECE 11.19 0.0893  country == SWITZERLAND 3.59 0.2788  ATC1 == D 1.6 0.6257 
country == JAPAN 10.65 0.0939  country == PORTUGAL 3.2 0.3120  ATC1 == H 1.59 0.6285 
country == FRANCE 10.09 0.0991  country == TURKEY 3.17 0.3154  ln_globalFirmSales   1.55 0.6435 
year == 2003 8.05 0.1242  ATC1 == N 2.88 0.3477  ATC1 == G 1.55 0.6459 
year == 2002 7.58 0.1319  LMAvgExpPg 2.82 0.3552  ln_lag_yrs 1.52 0.6584 
year == 2004 7.52 0.1330  country == S. AFRICA 2.63 0.3800  ATC1 == S 1.2 0.8312 
year == 2001 6.67 0.1500  ATC1 == L 2.53 0.3946  ATC1 == B 1.12 0.8897 
year == 2005 6.61 0.1514  ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_   2.38 0.4204  Mean VIF 16.58   
year == 2006 5.65 0.1770  country == FINLAND 2.36 0.4229     
 
Command:  
xi: regress _d LMAvgExpPg ExpMarketSizeUSD  NumGenFirmMed   ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_  ln_lag_yrs  ln_globalFirmSales  sequence  
ln_sequenceSq   i.year i.countrynosector i.atc1 
estat vif 
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Table A.7 Variance Inflation Factors with Herfindahl Index in ATC4  
Variable VIF 1/VIF  Variable VIF 1/VIF  Variable VIF 1/VIF 
year == 2003 7.71 0.1297  ATC1 == L 2.61 0.3835  country == JAPAN 1.99 0.5016 
year == 2004 7.26 0.1377  country == CANADA 2.49 0.4013  country == NETHERLANDS 1.95 0.5117 
year == 2002 7.21 0.1386  country == GERMANY 2.4 0.4160  country == POLAND 1.95 0.5128 
year == 2005 6.47 0.1545  ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_   2.38 0.4205  ATC1 == J 1.9 0.5271 
year == 2001 6.11 0.1636  country == SPAIN 2.36 0.4245  ATC1 == R 1.89 0.5286 
year == 2006 5.62 0.1781  country == FINLAND 2.31 0.4332  country == ITALY 1.85 0.5402 
sequence 5.34 0.1874  ATC1 == C 2.22 0.4506  country == BELGIUM 1.84 0.5448 
year == 2000 4.34 0.2305  country == PORTUGAL 2.19 0.4571  country == SWITZERLAND 1.79 0.5594 
ln_sequenceSq    4.21 0.2374  country == GREECE 2.17 0.4606  ATC1 == D 1.62 0.6154 
year == 2007 3.94 0.2539  country == UK 2.15 0.4645  ATC1 == H 1.59 0.6271 
ExpMarketSizeUSD 3.83 0.2608  ATC1 == M 2.14 0.4675  ln_globalFirmSales   1.56 0.6415 
country == US 3.46 0.2893  country == AUSTRIA 2.07 0.4823  ATC1 == G 1.55 0.6457 
ATC1 == N 2.97 0.3362  country == TURKEY 2.06 0.4865  ln_lag_yrs 1.52 0.6593 
LMAvgExpPg 2.81 0.3553  country == FRANCE 2.05 0.4879  ATC1 == S 1.2 0.8302 
country == S. Africa 2.63 0.3803  country == SWEDEN 2 0.4994  norm_IHHatc4_gen    1.2 0.8343 
        ATC1 == B 1.12 0.8916 
        Mean VIF 2.91   
 
Command: 
xi: regress _d LMAvgExpPg ExpMarketSizeUSD   norm_IHHatc4_gen   ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_  ln_lag_yrs  ln_globalFirmSales  sequence  
ln_sequenceSq   i.year i.countrynosector i.atc1 
 
estat vif 
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Table A.8 Robustness Check (Regulation): Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates  
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 
Variables 
cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit 
Regulation               
LMAvgExpPg 0.150*** 0.146***     0.150*** 0.146*** 0.129** 0.124** 0.146*** 0.141**   
  [0.0410] [0.0429]     [0.0410] [0.0430] [0.0430] [0.0451] [0.0425] [0.0447]   
L3ln_ExpPg   0.139*** 0.135**           
    [0.0419] [0.0439]           
ln_ExpPg     0.146*** 0.141***         
      [0.0407] [0.0426]         
L3ln_Pb             0.141*** 0.136** 
              [0.0418] [0.0437] 
medRatioPgPb     -0.291 0.016       -0.067 0.233 
      [0.9626] [1.0066]       [0.9588] [1.0032] 
RPS       0.161 0.198       
        [0.2421] [0.2496]       
GenSubst         0.43 0.409     
          [0.3548] [0.3695]     
LMAvgExpPgxlnT           0.012 0.013   
            [0.0177] [0.0196]   
Controls               
Market Size               
ExpMarketSizeUSD 0.132* 0.147** 0.127* 0.143* 0.130* 0.145** 0.131* 0.146** 0.122* 0.137* 0.129* 0.145** 0.129* 0.143* 
  [0.0534] [0.0561] [0.0529] [0.0556] [0.0532] [0.0558] [0.0533] [0.0560] [0.0543] [0.0569] [0.0534] [0.0560] [0.0527] [0.0555] 
Competition               
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.647*** 0.682*** 0.644*** 0.679*** 0.646*** 0.681*** 0.647*** 0.683*** 0.650*** 0.683*** 0.646*** 0.682*** 0.645*** 0.679*** 
  [0.0491] [0.0535] [0.0491] [0.0534] [0.0493] [0.0535] [0.0491] [0.0534] [0.0504] [0.0544] [0.0491] [0.0534] [0.0492] [0.0534] 
Molecule Charateristics               
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.064 -0.069 -0.064 -0.07 -0.054 -0.059 -0.062 -0.067 -0.06 -0.065 -0.062 -0.068 -0.064 -0.069 
  [0.0634] [0.0669] [0.0630] [0.0664] [0.0625] [0.0664] [0.0632] [0.0667] [0.0659] [0.0693] [0.0632] [0.0667] [0.0631] [0.0665] 
ln_lag_yrs 0.054 0.077 0.05 0.073 0.047 0.068 0.053 0.076 0.037 0.058 0.056 0.079 0.05 0.072 
  [0.0711] [0.0758] [0.0709] [0.0756] [0.0709] [0.0755] [0.0709] [0.0756] [0.0719] [0.0765] [0.0710] [0.0757] [0.0710] [0.0758] 
Firm Charateristics               
ln_globalFirmSales -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0 0 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
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  [0.0221] [0.0228] [0.0220] [0.0228] [0.0221] [0.0228] [0.0221] [0.0228] [0.0230] [0.0237] [0.0221] [0.0229] [0.0220] [0.0228] 
Time Since Risk Onset               
t 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
  [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0036] [0.0038] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0037] 
ln_(t*t) -0.348*** 
-
0.360*** 
-
0.345*** 
-
0.356*** 
-
0.344*** 
-
0.355*** 
-
0.348*** 
-
0.360*** 
-
0.357*** 
-
0.369*** 
-
0.353*** 
-
0.364*** 
-
0.345*** 
-
0.357*** 
  [0.0346] [0.0376] [0.0346] [0.0375] [0.0348] [0.0378] [0.0345] [0.0376] [0.0358] [0.0389] [0.0354] [0.0385] [0.0345] [0.0375] 
Heterogeneity Controls               
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model Stats               
Number of observations 19698 19698 19809 19809 19827 19827 19698 19698 18560 18560 19698 19698 19809 19809 
Log Likelihood -2083.37 -2082.67 -2095.24 -2094.59 -2092.62 -2091.99 -2083.12 -2082.32 -1955.74 -1955.23 -2083.01 -2082.36 -2095.04 -2094.47 
chi2 798.35 668 790.37 662.33 799.72 671.3 803.27 671.83 776.35 644.57 802.81 670.53 795.13 666.84 
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 
Akaike Info Criteria 4260.73 4259.34 4284.49 4283.18 4281.25 4279.98 4262.23 4260.64 4005.48 4004.47 4262.02 4260.73 4286.08 4284.93 
Bayesian Info Criteria 4631.48 4630.09 4655.5 4654.2 4660.2 4658.93 4640.87 4639.27 4373.44 4372.42 4640.65 4639.36 4664.98 4663.84 
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).  
Duration dependence is specified as t + ln (t *t), where t corresponds to months since risk onset.  
L3: lagged by one one quarter; LMAvg: Log Moving Average 
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Table A.9 Robustness Check (Market Size): Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates 
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 Variables 
cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit 
Market Size             
ExpMarketSizeUSD 0.127* 0.143*           
  [0.0529] [0.0556]           
ExpMarketSizeSU   0.06 0.071         
    [0.0493] [0.0520]         
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_     0.123* 0.140*       
      [0.0534] [0.0562]       
LMAvg_SU_molCtr_       0.054 0.066     
        [0.0496] [0.0524]     
L3ln_USD_moleculeCtry_i         0.103* 0.116*   
          [0.0514] [0.0541]   
L3ln_SU_moleculeCtry_i           0.044 0.053 
            [0.0473] [0.0499] 
Controls             
Expected Generic Price             
L3ln_ExpPg 0.139*** 0.135** 0.188** 0.194** 0.138*** 0.134** 0.181* 0.189* 0.157*** 0.154*** 0.190** 0.197** 
  [0.0419] [0.0439] [0.0712] [0.0742] [0.0420] [0.0440] [0.0715] [0.0746] [0.0416] [0.0436] [0.0688] [0.0717] 
Competition             
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.644*** 0.679*** 0.646*** 0.679*** 0.645*** 0.680*** 0.646*** 0.679*** 0.649*** 0.684*** 0.649*** 0.683*** 
  [0.0491] [0.0534] [0.0493] [0.0534] [0.0491] [0.0534] [0.0493] [0.0534] [0.0484] [0.0527] [0.0486] [0.0527] 
Molecule Characteristics             
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.064 -0.07 -0.011 -0.013 -0.061 -0.067 -0.006 -0.009 -0.036 -0.039 0.01 0.01 
  [0.0630] [0.0664] [0.0612] [0.0644] [0.0632] [0.0666] [0.0614] [0.0646] [0.0614] [0.0647] [0.0595] [0.0626] 
ln_lag_yrs 0.05 0.073 0.038 0.058 0.049 0.072 0.036 0.057 0.036 0.057 0.025 0.044 
  [0.0709] [0.0756] [0.0712] [0.0757] [0.0710] [0.0757] [0.0713] [0.0758] [0.0690] [0.0732] [0.0693] [0.0734] 
Firm Characteristics             
ln_globalFirmSales -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
  [0.0220] [0.0228] [0.0220] [0.0227] [0.0220] [0.0228] [0.0220] [0.0227] [0.0214] [0.0222] [0.0214] [0.0222] 
Time since risk onset             
t 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0038] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0038] [0.0034] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0037] 
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ln_(t*t) -0.345*** 
-
0.356*** 
-
0.341*** 
-
0.352*** 
-
0.345*** 
-
0.356*** 
-
0.341*** 
-
0.352*** 
-
0.363*** 
-
0.377*** 
-
0.359*** 
-
0.373*** 
  [0.0346] [0.0375] [0.0346] [0.0376] [0.0346] [0.0375] [0.0346] [0.0376] [0.0338] [0.0368] [0.0338] [0.0368] 
Heterogeneity Controls             
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model Stats             
Number of observations 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 20708 20708 20708 20708 
Log Likelihood -2095.24 -2094.59 -2098.68 -2098.37 -2095.58 -2094.86 -2098.91 -2098.59 -2149.67 -2149.19 -2152.4 -2152.2 
chi2 790.37 662.33 791.14 663.76 788.55 660.11 790.85 663.23 851 715.06 851.5 715.81 
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Akaike Info Criteria 4284.487 4283.184 4291.356 4290.748 4285.166 4283.73 4291.828 4291.181 4395.339 4394.377 4400.794 4400.41 
Bayesian Info Criteria 4655.5 4654.2 4662.37 4661.76 4656.18 4654.74 4662.84 4662.19 4776.38 4775.41 4781.83 4781.45 
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).  
Duration dependence is specified as t + ln (t *t), where t corresponds to months since risk onset.  
L3: lagged by one one quarter; LMAvg: Log Moving Average 
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Table A.10  Robustness Check (Competition): Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates  
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 Variables cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit 
Competition         
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.645*** 0.680***       
  [0.0491] [0.0534]       
NumbMolCtryAtc4_   0.003 0.004     
    [0.0074] [0.0075]     
NumGenFirmMed     -1.652 -1.528 -1.314 -0.869 
      [0.9857] [1.0172] [1.9361] [2.0172] 
firmSqMed       -0.106 -0.207 
        [0.5114] [0.5349] 
Controls         
Expected Generic Price         
L3ln_ExpPg 0.138*** 0.134** 0.080* 0.080* 0.080* 0.079* 0.080* 0.079* 
  [0.0420] [0.0440] [0.0382] [0.0397] [0.0374] [0.0388] [0.0374] [0.0387] 
Expected Market Size         
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_ 0.123* 0.140* 0.112* 0.120* 0.113* 0.120* 0.113* 0.120* 
  [0.0534] [0.0562] [0.0455] [0.0473] [0.0449] [0.0466] [0.0449] [0.0467] 
Molecule Characteristics         
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.061 -0.067 -0.036 -0.036 -0.038 -0.037 -0.038 -0.038 
  [0.0632] [0.0666] [0.0563] [0.0583] [0.0562] [0.0583] [0.0562] [0.0583] 
ln_lag_yrs 0.049 0.072 0.122* 0.128* 0.121* 0.127* 0.122* 0.128* 
  [0.0710] [0.0757] [0.0620] [0.0640] [0.0618] [0.0638] [0.0618] [0.0637] 
Firm Characteristics         
ln_globalFirmSales -0.002 -0.002 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 
  [0.0220] [0.0228] [0.0190] [0.0195] [0.0189] [0.0194] [0.0189] [0.0195] 
Time Since Risk Onset         
t 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017***
  [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0032] [0.0035] [0.0032] [0.0035] [0.0032] [0.0035] 
ln_(t*t) - - - - - - - -
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0.345*** 0.356*** 0.331*** 0.342*** 0.335*** 0.346*** 0.335*** 0.346***
  [0.0346] [0.0375] [0.0340] [0.0364] [0.0339] [0.0363] [0.0340] [0.0363] 
Heterogeneity         
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model Stats         
Number of observations 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 
Log Likelihood -2095.58 -2094.86 -2231.52 -2232.97 -2230.23 -2231.99 -2230.21 -2231.93 
chi2 788.55 660.11 719.56 659.22 723.32 668.24 721.62 664.89 
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Akaike Info Criteria 4285.17 4283.73 4557.04 4559.93 4554.46 4557.98 4556.43 4559.86 
Bayesian Info Criteria 4656.18 4654.74 4928.05 4930.94 4925.48 4928.99 4935.34 4938.76 
 
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).  
Duration dependence is specified as t + ln (t *t), where t corresponds to months since risk onset.  
L3: lagged by one one quarter; LMAvg: Log Moving Average 
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